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“…substantially undervalued…” 
- Tim Geithner, US Treasury, January 2011 
 
“…China manipulates its currency…” 
- Charles Schumer (D), February 2011 
 
“…huge competitive disadvantage…” 
   - President Obama, February 2010 
 
The quotes above convey the perception that China’s foreign exchange policy has had a 
harmful impact on the US economy. This paper examines whether China’s foreign 
exchange policy harmed the US economy with particular reference to its GDP and 
unemployment levels since the onset of the GFC.  We find, contrary to the commonly held 
belief, that China’s foreign exchange policy has in fact helped the US recover from the GFC, 
albeit at the cost of strategic dependency on Chinese demand for its government debt.   
 
Background to China’s Foreign Exchange Policy 
Like many developing nations, China maintains a managed, or pegged, currency exchange 
rate. Developing nations do so for several reasons including providing stability for trade 
and investment, allowing domestic infant industries to develop critical mass, and to acquire 
hard currency in its foreign reserves in preparation to enter a market-based arrangement 
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at a later stage. China maintains a de facto crawling peg against the USD allowing its value to 
fluctuate within a very narrow band predetermined by the People’s Bank of China. 
  Between 1994 and 2005, the exchange rate was fixed at close to 8.28 Yuan per USD. 
Reforms to the arrangements led the exchange rate to appreciate from 21 July 2005 until 
the process was halted in the midst of the GFC on 21 July 2008 when the exchange rate was 
held at close to 6.83 Yuan to the USD.  From 19 June 2010, after the worst acute effects of 
the GFC had passed, the appreciation of the Yuan commenced once again. 
  What is relevant to this paper is the exchange rate is set at a level which results in a large 
bilateral trade deficit to the US with China.  Furthermore, as China’s currency peg is 
maintained through the use of a closed capital account, China’s State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange acquires large volumes of foreign assets to balance capital flows.  These 
are largely held in the form of US Treasury Bonds and GSE securities. 
 
Direct Influence of Chinese Demand for US Debt Assets 
China’s policy to acquire high grade US debt can be considered as an exogenous upward 
shock to demand for these assets. As Borio & Disyatat (2011) state, there need not be a 
direct, bilateral, financing link between countries that have trade imbalances although 
such imbalances must clear on a global basis.  Nor does it follow that official reserves need 
necessarily be held in government issued debt or in the debt of government sponsored 
entities.  Alternative reserve investment policy choices could readily have led to large 
portfolio investment in other assets like equities or gold.  Morrison (2011) notes that US 
policymakers are openly concerned about a change in China’s policy stance with respect to 
US debt instruments.  This led to the introduction of bills in the 111th Congress to increase 
transparency of foreign government holdings of US debt and better assess exposure to such 
risks.  Consequently, we consider it a policy choice for the managers of China’s foreign 
reserves to invest heavily in US Treasury and GSE debt.  
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  As the supply curve for debt assets is presumed to be unchanged due to this policy, and 
neither curve is perfectly elastic or inelastic in practice, standard supply-demand analysis 
suggests that the price of bonds and quantities issued will rise in equilibrium as a result of 
an upward shift of the demand curve. 
  As at 28 February 2011, China held approximately USD 1.2 trillion worth of US Treasury 
Bonds.  This equates to approximately 12% of the total issuance of the bonds in public 
hands (source: CBO, author calculations).  China was the largest foreign holder of these 
bonds (source: US Treasury).  Additionally, China is estimated to hold approximately USD 
500 billion of Government Sponsored Entity debt.  
 
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010) estimated the effect of the first of the more 
recent US efforts to monetise debt, which formed part of a USD 1.725 trillion expansion of 
the Fed balance sheet, was to reduce the yield on US 10 year bonds by between 38 and 82 
basis points.  As a result, China’s foreign exchange policies, which resulted in large 
purchases of US government debt, have probably placed downward pressure on the yield 
for US debt securities and therefore produced an improvement on the terms under which 
the US Government was able to finance significant fiscal deficits in 2009 and 2010.  
 
The Impact on Trade 
The US is a capital rich economy with relatively high average wages.  In contrast, China is a 
country in which capital is relatively scarce and wages are materially lower in comparison 
to its industrialised trade partners.  As an indication of this, GNI per capita for China was 
USD 3,650 in 2009 (source: World Bank).  The corresponding figure for the US was USD 
46,360.  While some commentators (for example, The Economist) highlight that Chinese 
wages and unit labour costs have accelerated since June 2009, low labour costs appear to 
remain an area of comparative advantage for China which continued to enjoy a substantial 
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surplus of USD 15.8bn through 2010 in traded goods (source: China National Bureau of 
Statistics). 
  The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem suggests that trade patterns should reflect relative factor 
endowments.  China has a relative abundance in labour and the US has substantive capital 
assets in place. The broad predictions of the model appear to hold empirically with China’s 
main exports to the US being labour intensive goods like consumer electronics and apparel.  
In contrast, the US exports mainly capital goods like civilian aircraft and also other 
elaborately transformed manufactures (source: Bureau of Economic Analysis).  
  One important outcome is that the US imports disinflation from this trading partner.  The 
rate of inflation on Chinese imported goods was 0.9% per annum for the two years to March 
2011.  This was materially below the figure of 3.4% for total imports, excluding fuels.  This 
compares to the growth in the CPI experienced over the same period of 2.5% per annum or, 
excluding food and energy, 1.1% (Source: Department of Labour).   
  By helping to keep inflation well anchored and within acceptable US monetary policy 
target bounds, China’s policies provided flexibility to Fed officials as they pursued 
unconventional measures to stimulate the economy. However, significant wage escalation 
in China during 2011, impacting the cost of exports to the US, may disrupt this 
accommodation if not contained. 
  Having established that China’s policies have contributed to lower inflation and interest 
rates in the US, we consider how these influences affected aggregate demand and 
employment. 
 
The Taylor Rule and GDP 
The Taylor Rule, used as a guide to monetary policy settings for central banks, provides a 
credible and useful rule of thumb linking recommended interest rates, inflation and GDP.  
Although there are several versions of the Taylor Rule, one of the simplest provides 
adequate insight for our purposes.  It states: 
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Change in Interest Rate =  0.5 x (Actual Inflation Rate - Target Inflation Rate) + 
   0.5 x (GDP Growth – Trend Measure of GDP Growth) 
 
  The rule recommends easing monetary policy if inflation and output are below targeted 
levels. As previously discussed, China’s policies place downward pressure on interest rates 
and actual inflation experience.  It follows then, that China’s policies provided an impetus 
and opportunity to close the output gap which had ballooned after the GFC.   
  In addition, it is noteworthy that the Fed Funds rate had fallen below 0.25% by April 2008.  
The Fed had expanded its traditional open market operations to include acquiring GSE 
securities and mortgage backed securities by November 2008.  These were further 
expanded from March 2009.   
  The Fed’s quantitative easing program was undertaken to stimulate domestic capital 
formation and consumption, both of which boost GDP.  As China’s purchases of similar 
securities are a feature of their foreign exchange policy, their actions arguably contributed 
to improving US GDP.   
 
Okun’s Law, GDP and Unemployment 
Okun’s Law is an empirical observation that links GDP with changes in unemployment rates 
via an inverse relationship.   
 In the following chart, we show the inverse relationship between GDP and variation in 
unemployment rates in the US; both are seasonally adjusted.     
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Source: FactSet, BEA, June 1991 to March 2011 
 
 
 
We examined the correlation between the changes in GDP and unemployment with 
different lags between the two.  The analysis highlights that causality appears to flow from 
GDP to change in unemployment: 
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Source: FactSet, BEA, June 1991 to March 2011 
 
By combining Okun’s Law with the likely direction of causality, it appears that China’s 
policies have also assisted with limiting the level of unemployment experienced in the US 
after the GFC.  
       
Potential Adverse Consequences of China’s Foreign Exchange Policies for the US 
China’s policies have left the US exposed to the possibility that a shift in targeted reserve 
composition could result in an adverse outcome.  Reserve composition might alter 
following a change in the exchange rate regime itself or, more narrowly, via a change in 
China’s reserve portfolio investment strategy. 
  Continued confidence in the performance of the US with respect to the ability and 
preparedness to honour its debt obligation is of vital importance to sustain the economic 
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recovery efforts.  Any sign from China that it has lost confidence in its holdings will be 
closely scrutinised.  With the US Federal Government reporting annual fiscal deficits 
approximating 10% of GDP in recent years and an estimated government debt position of 
69.4% of GDP in 2011 (source: CBO, debt held in public hands), China has substantive ability 
to inflict harm on the US economy if it chose to, albeit not without cost to its own economic 
structure.   
  The US is vulnerable to China’s ongoing appetite for US Treasury securities for its 
economic recovery.   Nevertheless, in seeking to recover from the GFC, this support has 
been invaluable to the US and arguably to the entire set Western economies.  
  Some economists and policy makers believe that global trade and current account 
imbalances arising from China’s policies contributed to the GFC. For example, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2009) found relationships between housing price changes and deterioration in 
current account balances for industrialised countries in the period preceding the GFC, 
providing grounds for supporting such beliefs. 
  Nonetheless, in the immediate period following the GFC, US monetary policy was targeted 
at containing a collapse in aggregate demand and towards taking steps to ensure that the 
supply of credit was not suddenly withdrawn.  To that end, China’s policies were 
instrumental in supporting the efforts of the US Federal Reserve and US Treasury. 
  From China’s perspective, the policy makers face extraordinary challenges with managing 
the economic emergence of its populace.  With the knowledge that “sudden stops” and 
runaway inflation have interrupted the economic prosperity of many emerging economies, 
it judges that sterilisation of flows and a managed currency via closed capital account are 
appropriate policy tools for the current stage of development.   
  The interventions cause certain imbalances in the economy, possibly producing a “savings 
glut” (Bernanke 2005). This reduces the cost of debt and a related search for yield 
phenomenon can create perverse incentives, leading to dislocations like the housing 
bubble.  As such, China is often accused of contributing to the GFC itself. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
In the period following the GFC, China’s demand for US issued Treasury bonds and ability to 
export disinflation to US consumers appears to have assisted a recovery in GDP and helped 
to limit the level of unemployment.  The demand for US Treasury Bonds was also crucial in 
financing fiscal stimulus programs in 2009 and 2010. 
 
  In the longer term, the US appears to have grounds to seek to limit the extent to which it 
is reliant and beholden to China as a financier from a strategic perspective and, possibly, 
due to empirical associations between global imbalances and subsequent financial system 
instability.  
  Chinese officials believe that the costs of adjustment associated with a rapid appreciation 
of the Yuan would be high and contribute to domestic instability with global consequences.  
Additionally, some analysts observe a risk that Chinese policy reform would remove a large 
buyer of US debt from the market and offer no clear replacement.  
  It seems appropriate that progress towards reforming the currency policy should be 
undertaken in measured way. 
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